State of Utah v. Kimberly Shea Havatone : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
State of Utah v. Kimberly Shea Havatone : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Pace; Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n; Counsel for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Stephen L. Nelson; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney;
Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Havatone, No. 20070135 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/87
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20070135-CA 
v. : 
KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006), in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden 
presiding. The defendant is not incarcerated. 
JOHN PACE (5624) 
PATRICK S. TAN (09050) 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COuftlb 
JUN 0 6 2007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20070135-CA 
v. : 
KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006), in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden 
presiding. The defendant is not incarcerated. 
JOHN PACE (5624) 
PATRICK S. TAN (09050) 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
The Evidence in General 4 
Admission of statement regarding an unrelated crime because 
it was relevant to "context" and because it was a statement 
against interest 6 
Mention and use of "forgery" at trial 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12 
ARGUMENT 14 
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ARRESTING 
OFFICER TO REPEAT THE DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-
COURT DECLARATION ABOUT COMMITTING 
FORGERY 16 
A. The Defendant's Statement that She May have 
Committed Forgery but Not Drug Possession 
Constitutes Inadmissible Character Evidence 16 
1. The state introduced the forgery statement to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith 18 
i 
Page 
2. The statement was not admitted to prove any 
exception to the rule against bad act evidence 
set forth in rule 404(b) 20 
B. Committing Forgery Constitutes a Bad Act pursuant 
To Rule 404(b) 24 
POINT II: THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ALLOWING THE OFFICER TO SAY THE 
DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR FORGERY 25 
POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE 
TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT AS 
TO THE DETAILS OF HER FORGERY 
CONVICTION 30 
POINT IV: THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT 35 
A. The Prosecutor Impermissibly Accused Defense 
Counsel of Misleading the Jury 36 
B. The Prosecutor Accused the Defendant of "Passing 
Bad Checks" Even Though No Such Evidence 
Was Presented at Trial 38 
C. The Prosecutor Voiced His Personal Opinion that the 
Page 
Defendant Lied When She Denied Drug Possession 39 
D. The Prosecutor Urged Consideration of Inadmissible 
Character Evidence 40 
POINT V: TAKEN ALONE OR TOGETHER, THE ERRORS 
DETAILED ABOVE CAUSED HARM 41 
CONCLUSION 43 
ii 
ADDENDUM A: Sentencing Minutes 
ADDENDUM B: Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2006) (amended by 2007 Laws 
Ch. 374 HB 231) 
ADDENDUM C: Utah R. Evid. 402, 403,404 and 609 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Commonwealth v. Gilman, 368 A.2d 253 (1977) 36 
People v. Ojeda, 758 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1985) 24 
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 108 P.3d 730 40 
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799 35 
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 55 P.3d 573 1,2 
State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 944 P.2d 177 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 41 
State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, 15 P.3d 635 3 
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 3, 36 
State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) 1, 2, 18, 20, 22, 24 
State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, 138 P.3d 90 40 
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) 17, 18, 23 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 42 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) 23, 24, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42 
State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194, cert denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003) 16 
State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993) 25 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 39 
State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989) 3 
State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, 113 P.3d 998 35, 41 
State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, 994 P.2d 1237 1, 2, 41 
iv 
Page 
State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, 996 P.2d 555, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000) 
25 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 39,40 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 3 
State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, 153 P.3d 830 1, 2, 41 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 17, 30, 31 
State v. Verde, 170 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 42 
United States v. Gar cia-Mor ales, 382 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004) 28 
United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1981) 21, 25 
United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2005) 26, 27 
United States v. Lamberty, 778 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1985) 21, 25, 27 
United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979) 29 
United States v. Mills, 704F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1983) 29 
United States v. Sheffield, 992F.2d 1164 (11th Cir. 1993) 28 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2006) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003) 11, 24, 38 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2002) 1 
Other Authorities 
22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5162 (1978) 21 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1980) 39 
McCormick on Evidence § 185 (2d ed. 1972) 21 
v 
Page 
Weinstein'sEvidence (1980) 21 
Wigmore on Evidence § 58.2 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) 17 
Rules 
UtahR. Evid. 401 2, 7, 9, 20, 21, 25 
Utah R. Evid. 402 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 18, 20,22, 24, 25 
Utah R. Evid. 403 1, 2, 4, 7, 18, 22, 23, 25, 29 
Utah R. Evid. 404 1, 2, 4, 7, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 40 
Utah R. Evid. 608 7 
Utah R. Evid. 609 2,4, 13, 23, 25, 30, 31, 35, 41 
Utah R. Evid. 801 19,24 
vi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20070135-CA 
v. 
KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from third-degree felony 
convictions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue I: Did the trial court err in violation of evidence rules 402-404 by admitting 
the defendant's statement that she committed forgery? 
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidence rulings are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah 1999). '"Notwithstanding error by 
the trial court, we will not reverse a conviction if we find that the error was harmless.'" 
State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517,128, 153 P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Calliham, 
2002 UT 86,% 45, 55 P.3d 573). "An error is harmless when it is 'sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of proceedings.'" Id. (quoting State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 10 n.l, 994 
P.2d 1237). 
Preservation: The defendant objected to admission of both the statement about 
committing forgery, as well as mentioning that the arrest warrant issued upon forgery 
charges, pursuant to rules 401-404, during pretrial proceedings. R. 119:5-6. In the 
alternative, admission of either mention of forgery constitutes plain error. 
Issue II: Did the trial court err in violation of evidence rules 402 and 403 by 
admitting testimony that the defendant was initially arrested on forgery charges? 
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidence rulings are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Decor so, 993 P.2d at 843. "' Notwithstanding error by the trial court, we will 
not reverse a conviction if we find that the error was harmless.5" Rhinehart, 2006 UT 
App 517 at If 28 (quoting State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86 at Tf 45). "An error is harmless 
when it is 'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of proceedings.5" Id. (quoting Loose, 2000 UT 11 at f^ 
lOn.l). 
Preservation: The defendant objected to admission of both the statement about 
committing forgery, as well as mentioning that the arrest warrant issued upon forgery 
charges, pursuant to rules 401-404, during pretrial proceedings. R. 119:5-6. In the 
alternative, admission of either mention of forgery constitutes plain error. 
Issue III: Did the court err in violation of evidence rule 609 by allowing the 
defendant to be cross-examined as to details of a prior forgery conviction, the statutory 
elements of the crime of forgery, and that forgery was a crime of dishonesty. 
Standard of Review: "'The test for harmless error in cases involving an 
erroneous failure to exclude prior convictions is whether, absent the error, there was a 
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reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant.'" State v. Cravens, 2000 
UT App 344, If 13, 15 P.3d 635 (quoting State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989)). 
Preservation: Defense counsel objected to the cross-examination of the 
defendant as to the statutory elements of forgery. R. 119:197-98. The court overruled 
the objection and authorized the prosecutor to ask more "questions" in pursuit of this line 
of inquiry. R. 119:198. In the alternative, allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the 
defendant as to the statutory elements of forgery and whether it constitutes a crime of 
dishonest constitutes plain error. 
Issue IV: Did prosecutorial misconduct occur when, during rebuttal, he 
disparaged defense counsel's integrity, stated that the defendant committed bad acts that 
were not supported by evidence in the record, and asserted that because the defendant 
was "lying" when she committed forgery, she also was "lying" when she first denied 
drug possession and requested a drug test. 
Standard of Review: Prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, and requires reversal where 
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the 
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result. . . . 
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (alteration and ellipsis in 
original) (quoting State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
Preservation: To the extent the prosecution's impermissible statements brought 
to the jurors' attention matters that should not have figured into their deliberations 
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because they constituted irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or inadmissible character 
evidence, the statements were preserved for appellate review by defense counsel's 
objections noted supra, Issues MIL See R. 119:5-6, 197-98. In the alternative, the 
misconduct constituted plain error. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2006) (amended by 2007 Utah Laws Ch. 374 
HB 231) is attached as Addendum B. 
Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404 and 609 are attached as Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged by information with one count of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006). R. 1-2. The defendant was bound over for trial following a 
preliminary hearing. R. 27-28. Following a one-day jury trial, the defendant was 
convicted as charged. R. 89. On February 5, 2007, the defendant was sentenced to 0-5 
years in the Utah State Prison. R. 101-102. The prison sentence was suspended, and 36 
months probation, including sixty days in jail, was imposed. Id. The sentencing minutes 
(R. 101-102) are attached as Addendum A. The Notice of Appeal was filed on February 
8, 2007. The parties stipulated to one 30-day extension for the filing of the defendant's 
opening brief, which now is due June 6, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence in general. Only two witnesses testified - the arresting officer and 
the defendant. See R. 119 (trial transcript). The arresting officer confronted the 
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defendant at her hotel and placed her under arrest based upon an outstanding forgery 
warrant. R. 119:130-32. The defendant was wearing the oversized t-shirt in which she 
slept when the officer arrived at the hotel. R. 119:195. The officer allowed the defendant 
to put on clothes before handcuffing her. R. 119:148-49, 195-96. The officer handcuffed 
the defendant so that her hands were restrained in back. R. 119:149-50. The officer 
searched the coat defendant would wear outside, and he performed a pat-down search of 
the defendant. R. 119:132-33. Nothing of mention was discovered. See R. 119:133-34. 
Still cuffed in back, the defendant was placed in the back seat of the officer's 
patrol car and was further restrained by a standard combination seatbelt and shoulder 
harness. R. 119:152-53. While handcuffs are "inherently uncomfortable," they become 
even more so when a person cuffed in back is forced to sit down and lean back. R. 
119:150. The seat cushion in the back of the officer's patrol car causes a passenger to 
lean back against the seat. R. 119:179-80. 
When an arrestee is placed in the back seat, the arresting officer typically monitors 
the arrestee's movement through the rearview mirror while he is driving. R. 119:158-59. 
It was the arresting officer's "habit . . . to keep an eye on folks in the backseat" of his 
patrol car. R. 119:141. In this case, it was snowing when the officer drove the defendant 
to jail. Id. While he was driving to the jail, the officer did not observe the defendant 
"doing anything suspicious," "wiggling or struggling," or "trying to do anything evasive 
as far as her hands go or her body movements." R. 119:159. 
The backseat of the patrol car consists of a standard bench on which sits a cushion. 
R. 119:109, 122-23. The bench is level, sloping neither forward nor backward. R. 
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119:179. The officer testified that he always lifts the seat cushion after transporting a 
prisoner to search for any contraband the prisoner may have attempted to leave behind. 
R. 119:124. The officer, however, did not bother to remove "old debris" and "foliage" 
that also collected under the seat cushion. R. 119:157. 
At the jail, the officer told the defendant to get out of the car. R. 119:135. The 
officer lifted the seat cushion and brought out a small amount, or a "twist," of 
methamphetamine. Id. He testified that the drug was found "almost directly in the 
middle" of the seat cushion, not to side where the defendant was belted and handcuffed. 
R. 119:154. 
According to the officer, when he showed the "twist" to the defendant, the 
defendant said, "I did a forgery but I don't do drugs, you can test me." R. 119:142. 
The defendant denied possessing, or "know[ing] anything about that 
methamphetamine." R. 119:196. 
Admission of statement regarding an unrelated crime because it was relevant 
to "context'' and because it was a statement against interest. The day before trial, the 
parties' counsel agreed the state could mention that the defendant was arrested pursuant 
to a warrant, but that anything regarding forgery was not important. According to the 
prosecutor, "I told Mr. Tan that the fact that it was a forgery warrant is not especially 
important to me, that I didn't have a problem instructing my police officer to refer to the 
warrant just as an arrest warrant and not a warrant for a forgery." R. 119:2-3. 
On the morning of trial, however, the state indicated that it wanted to bring in the 
defendant's statement made when the officer accused the defendant of stashing a "twist" 
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of methamphetamine in the patrol car. R. 119:3. At that time, the defendant said she 
committed the forgery, but never possessed drugs. Id. She also requested a drug test. Id. 
Defense counsel objected to mentioning the warrant was issued on forgery charges 
and to admission of the defendant's statement about forgery pursuant to rules 401 and 
402, Utah R. Evid., noting that the defendant was on trial for one charge - drug 
possession - and was not on trial for anything involving a charge of forgery. R. 119:5. 
Counsel noted that the defense to constructive possession of drugs bore no relation to 
"forgery or anything related to the forgery case." Id. 
Defense counsel also objected pursuant to rule 403 because reference to a forgery 
charge caused unfair prejudice insofar as a juror is likely to believe that "history repeats 
itself, she's probably a habitual criminal, if she committed the forgery, she most likely 
was in possession of the drugs." R. 119:6. 
Defense counsel also objected to any statement offered by the arresting officer that 
"forgery and drugs go hand in hand" because no other evidence would corroborate such a 
claim. R. 119:6. 
Defense counsel also objected pursuant to rules 404 and 608, claiming that where 
as here forgery has nothing to do with the drug possession charge, the only possible effect 
of mentioning forgery would be to damage the defendant's character and credibility. R. 
119:7. 
Defense counsel explained that, until this point, the defendant had not been 
planning to testify precisely because were she to do so it might open the door to mention 
of the forgery charge. R. 119:7. 
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The state argued that the defendant's statement about committing forgery "is 
absolutely relevant because the underlying contact between the police officer and the 
defendant was a warrant for forgery." R. 119:8. It argued that the defendant's statement 
about committing forgery should "come in as a conversation that the officer had with the 
defendant in furtherance of his investigation (inaudible)." Id. 
Defense counsel queried what possible purpose for mentioning forgery existed if 
not to convince the jury that the defendant needed money, a need that flowed from drug 
use. R. 119:9. Counsel repeated his concern that the forgery evidence was being offered 
to establish the defendant's criminal character. Id. 
The court ruled that the officer could testify the arrest warrant was issued on 
forgery charges because the mention of forgery was relevant to "context." R. 119:10. 
The court ruled that while the officer might testify that it was a "forgery arrest," he 
should not make "any connection between forgery and drugs. . . . I think it is allowable 
that it be referred to as a forgery arrest warrant but no other connection otherwise. Is that 
clear?" R. 119:13; ^ ee id. (responding to the court's question, the state responded, "Yes 
absolutely. I'll make sure that that happens.") 
The court ruled the declaration was admissible as a statement against interest 
being offered by the state: 
And just for the record and my ruling just to be clear is the denial was that 
she owned the drugs. The admission that I'm allowing to come in was that 
she has been convicted of a forgery charge and that's why I'm allowing the 
forgery charge to come in because she admitted to the officer as a prior 
statement^] . . . [I]t's just that I'm allowing that in because it was a 
statement that the defendant made against her interest that's being offered 
by the State. That's why I'm allowing it to come in. 
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R. 119:14. 
In addressing defendant's rule 401 and 402 relevance objections, the court 
explained that the statement about the forgery arrest warrant is "certainly relevant 
because it offers context[.]" R. 119:15. Regarding unfair prejudice, the court explained 
that because the officer already intended to mention an arrest warrant, simply clarifying 
that the warrant related to forgery would cause no further prejudice. Id. As for the 
defendant's declaration about forgery, the court identified no fact of consequence to 
which it related; but rather repeated that the declaration is admissible as a statement 
against interest. Id. 
As to the prejudicial relevant issues that are raised by 404, 401, 402, all of 
the other things that were argued, I am finding that because information was 
going to come in that there was an arrest warrant, that that was the police 
contact and that is appropriately coming in. The fact that it was a bench 
warrant or an arrest warrant for forgery is not so much more prejudicial that 
it's certainly relevant because it offers context and it is not so much more 
prejudicial that it substantially outweighs the probative purpose for it. So I 
am ruling on the other arguments that have been made as to prejudice and 
probativeness but I'm allowing it to come in because the defendant made a 
statement against her interest[.] 
R. 119:14-15. 
Mention and use of "forgery" at trial. Following opening statements, defense 
counsel informed the court that he was not sure whether the defendant would testify. R. 
119:96. Counsel explained that the decision would depend upon how much testimony 
there was about forgery: 
I believe it's going to come down to how much of Officer Malley's 
testimony will be in regards to the forgery issue and based on what I was 
able to find out, if in fact there is going to be testimony to the extent or to 
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what extent that's going to come in, I may have no other alternative than to 
put Ms. Havatone on the stand to try to explain further to the jury and we'll 
have to play that by ear. 
R. 119:96. 
The officer testified that arrest warrant issued on forgery charges: 
The State: Do you remember the purpose of that warrant? 
Officer Malley: Forgery. 
R. 119:132. 
The officer testified that when he confronted the defendant with the 
methamphetamine he found in the back of the patrol car, "she told me, ' I did a forgery 
but I don't do drugs, you can test me.'" R. 119:142. The officer did not testify that the 
forgery related to the defendant's motive or plan to possess a controlled substance. See 
id. 
Following the officer's testimony, the defendant was called to testify. R. 119:192. 
When asked by defense counsel about the forgery warrant, the defendant testified, "I pled 
guilty to a forgery that I committed and I took the responsibility for that." R. 119:193-94. 
She then testified that she "told Officer Malley that I did commit the forgery and that I 
didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car." R. 119:194. The 
defendant did not testify to her reputation regarding honesty, nor did she go into any 
more details about the prior forgery conviction. See id. 
On cross-examination, the defendant admitted to pleading guilty to a forgery 
charge earlier that year. R. 219:196-97. The state then examined the defendant as to the 
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actual elements of forgery, reading the definition of elements from Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-501(a) (2003) (except to add "she"): 
And just so that I'm clear and (inaudible) forgery, real quick so forgery is 
something that somebody is guilty of, with the purpose to defraud anyone or 
with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he 
or she alters a writing of another without his authority or other such altered 
writing or makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to the act of another, whether the person is existent or non-existent, 
what purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than what's in the (inaudible) case or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. That's what a forgery is, right? 
R. 119:197. 
The defendant objected to the relevance of the elements of forgery given that the 
only issue properly before the court was the defendant's culpability for possessing an 
illegal substance. R. 119:197. 
The state argued that the "door was opened to discussion along these lines." R. 
119:198. It argued that the term "forgery" is "amorphous," and, "I think it's important 
for everybody in the court to be clear so that we're all on the same page in terms of what 
we're talking about." Id. 
The court overruled the defendant's objection. R. 119:198. 
The defendant answered that those were the elements of forgery. R. 119:198. 
The state continued beyond definition of "forgery," asking, "So this is a situation 
that involves someone's honesty, doesn't it?" R. 119:198. 
The defendant replied, "Yes." R. 119:198. 
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In closing argument rebuttal, the state declared that defense counsel's argument 
about forgery not being at issue was an attempt to mislead the jury; and that, in his 
personal opinion, the defendant was "lying" when she first denied possessing drugs and 
requested a drug test precisely because she "lied" when she committed forgery: 
I want to talk to you about the conflicts of the evidence today because you 
heard from one person from the prosecution's side and one person from the 
defense's side and the defense in his closing argument made a pretty big 
deal about the fact that the defendant had been convicted of forgery, wanted 
to bring that to your attention and make sure that you're clear on the fact 
that there's no forgery charge today. Why do you think that is, ladies and 
gentlemen? Think about that for a second. Why was he so insistent about 
that? I'll tell you why, he wants to divert your attention away from the fact 
that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, 
passing bad checks. You heard the definition of what a forgery is. I'm not 
here to tell you that the defendant is a bad person. I'm not trying to tell you 
that. What I am here to tell you is that you have to weigh the statements of 
two separate people. When you go back to the jury room you should believe 
what Officer Malley told you. Officer Malley is the more credible witness 
in this case. Did the defendant say the drugs didn't belong to her? Yeah. 
She said it on January 27th, did [sic] take responsibility for them then and 
didn't take responsibility for them today. The defense would lead you to 
believe that because she admitted to the forgery, what she was saying about 
the drugs was also true. That to me is very strange, ladies and gentlemen, 
because she admits to lying about something, having lied in the past and 
then wants you to believe that she's not lying on that day. Don't be fooled 
by this. Don't be fooled. 
R. 119:241-42. 
Summary of Argument 
Point I: The court abused its discretion in allowing the officer to repeat the 
defendant's declaration that she had committed forgery. Especially after the court ruled 
that the officer could not connect forgery with drugs, her concession was not relevant to 
any fact of consequence. Evidence of a prior conviction that is not properly admitted per 
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the limitations of evidence rule 404(b) or 609 is presumed prejudicial. The prosecutor 
wanted the statement to come in for the sole purpose of impugning the defendant's 
character, as evidenced by his argument during rebuttal that the defendant was 
"dishonest[ ]" and "lying" when she committed forgery, therefore she "lied" when she 
admitted committing forgery but denied doing drugs and requested a drug test. 
Point II: The court abused its discretion when it permitted the officer to 
testify that the defendant's initial arrest occurred pursuant to a warrant issued on forgery 
charges. Again, that the defendant was wanted for, or may have committed forgery was 
not relevant to any fact of consequence. Labeling her a forger was unfairly prejudicial. 
The court's ruling that mention of forgery should come in as "context," was error because 
even context must relate in some way to the crime for which the defendant is standing 
trial. In this case, forgery bore no relation to constructive possession of drugs or the 
defense thereto. 
Point III: The court abused its discretion overruling the defendant's objection 
to the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant on the elements of forgery, and 
that forgery involves dishonesty. Rule 609 permits introduction of certain prior 
convictions for the sole purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility as a witness. 
Absent circumstances not relevant to this case, rule 609 only permits inquiry into the 
prior conviction's nature, date and sentence. The prosecutor exceeded these bounds 
when the court allowed him to question the defendant about the elements of forgery. 
Such questioning was even more prejudicial than going into the actual details of the 
crime (which also is impermissible) because it left the jury to speculate how many of the 
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different statutory ways to commit forgery the defendant engaged in. This error became 
evident when, during rebuttal, the prosecutor transformed impeachment evidence into 
substantive character evidence by arguing that because the defendant was "lying" when 
she committed forgery, she also "lied" when she initially denied involvement with drugs 
and requested a drug test. 
Point IV: The prosecutor committed misconduct when transformed 
impeachment evidence into unabashed character evidence by arguing that because the 
defendant was "lying" when she committed forgery, she also "lied" when she initially 
denied involvement with drugs. Moreover, the prosecutor impermissibly attacked 
defense counsel's integrity, and attributed criminal acts to the defendant that were 
unsupported by any evidence adduced at trial. 
Point V: Whether considered individually or together, these errors may not be 
dismissed as harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
. The court erred in allowing the officer to testify about the defendant's irrelevant 
statement that she committed forgery and that she was initially arrested for forgery, and 
also in overruling the defendant's objection to being cross-examined regarding details of 
the forgery conviction. These errors facilitated the prosecutor's misconduct in wielding 
the forgery as substantive character evidence. Especially because the evidence in this 
case was close, this improper use of bad act evidence may not be dismissed as harmless. 
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In this case, the state initially conceded that no reason existed for mentioning 
forgery. R. 119:2-3. The prosecutor told the court that "the fact that it was a forgery 
warrant is not especially important to [the prosecution]." R. 119:3. 
Just minutes prior to jury selection, however, the prosecutor informed the court 
that it wanted the officer to explain that the arrest warrant issued on a forgery charge. R. 
119:3. He had only recently re-read the officer's report and noticed the defendant's 
statement that, when first shown the substance recovered from the patrol car's backseat, 
she may have committed forgery, but did not possess drugs. Id. The prosecutor said he 
wanted the officer to recount the defendant's statement as part of the conversation in 
which the officer told the defendant that, in his experience, forgery and drug use go hand-
in-hand. Id. 
The court excluded the officer's opinion about the relation between forgery and 
drugs because it was too prejudicial, and because it would constitute inadmissible expert 
opinion testimony. R. 119:12. Despite eliminating the only basis proffered for admitting 
the statement, the court ruled that the officer could repeat the defendant's statement, and 
also that the defendant was initially arrested for forgery. E.g., R. 119:10-11, 13, 14-15. 
As detailed below, these erroneous pretrial rulings affected the course of the entire 
trial, through closing arguments when the prosecutor used bad act evidence to brand the 
defendant as a liar when she committed the forgery, and thus a liar when she initially 
denied possessing drugs. 
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POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ARRESTING OFFICER 
TO REPEAT THE DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-COURT 
DECLARATION ABOUT COMMITTING FORGERY. 
The court abused its discretion in allowing the arresting officer to repeat the 
defendant's declaration that she committed forgery because it constitutes inadmissible 
character evidence (Sec. A), and it erred as a matter of law in concluding that committing 
forgery did not constitute a bad act pursuant to rule 404(b) (Sec. B).1 
A. The Defendant's Statement that She May Have Committed Forgery but Not 
Drug Possession Constitutes Inadmissible Character Evidence. 
This is a case about constructive drug possession, based entirely upon 
circumstantial evidence. See R. 119:7 (trial court's summation of the case during pretrial 
proceedings), 214 (the state in closing argument conceding the absence of direct 
evidence). The state initially sought to justify admission of the defendant's statement that 
she committed forgery through the officer's testimony because it intended to link forgery 
and drug use through the officer's testimony. R. 119:3. The prosecutor explained that 
when Ms. Havatone is taken out of the police car and the drugs are found, 
the police officer confronts Ms. Havatone about the drugs and says it's my 
experience that forgery and drugs are sometimes related and so (inaudible) 
in addition to some other factors, I think (inaudible) belong to you. Ms. 
Havatone replied to the police officer said [sic] I did the forgery but these 
aren't my drugs. 
This brief draws from interpretations of the federal rules of evidence. Where, as here, 
the state rules at issue are substantively identical to their federal counterparts, such 
reliance is appropriate. See State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f^ 30 n.l, 52 P.3d 1194 
("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are a separate body of law from the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, if the reasoning of a federal case interpreting or applying a federal 
evidentiary rule is cogent and logical, we may freely look to that case, absent a Utah case 
directly on point, when we interpret or apply an analogous Utah evidentiary rule."), cert, 
denied, 537 U.S. 1123(2003). 
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R. 119:3. 
The court ruled the officer could not testify to any such link. R. 119:12. Even so, 
and without identifying any other fact of possible consequence for which the statement 
was probative, the court admitted the declaration about forgery as a statement against 
interest. E.g., R. 119:14 (ruling the statement admissible "because it was a statement that 
the defendant made against her interest that's being offered by the state"). In so doing, 
the court abused its discretion. 
Evidence of prior criminal activity is presumed prejudicial because of "the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of bad character rather than 
because he is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 741 (Utah 1985), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489 
(Utah 1997). The Court in Doporto expressly recognized a presumption against 
admissibility of testimony regarding past criminal history: 
For the reasons stated by Dean Wigmore, the prejudice that can flow from 
admitting evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant can be 
unusually prejudicial, raising acute concerns of fundamental fairness arising 
from the real possibility that the defendant will be convicted for his 
presumed bad character rather than his acts. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489 (citing 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. ed. 
1983)). See State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Generally, inquiry 
into the details of prior convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to 
plain error"). 
Following the 1998 amendment of rule 404(b), the Court called into question its 
Doporto ruling that required "very limited deference" to a trial court's admission of bad 
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1. The state introduced the forgery statement to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. "Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]" Utah R. Evid. 404(a). In particular, bad 
act testimony is not admissible for the purpose of proving character: "Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
In this case, when the court ruled the officer could not link forgery and drugs, any 
relevance of the forgery statement as foundation or "context" for said link was eliminated. 
The state, however, then urged its admission as an "inconsistent statement": "I mean, it's 
an inconsistent statement there, Judge. It's admitting one thing but not admitting to 
another thing. . . . It's the inconsistency there that I'm seeking to bring in." R. 119:10. 
act evidence. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 *h 16, 993 P.2d 837. The 1998 amendment to 
rule 404(b) clarified that evidence of other crimes and bad acts is admissible if they are 
relevant to a non-character purpose spelled out in rule 404(b), and they meet the 
relevancy requirements of rules 402 and 403. The Court declared a return to the pre-
Doporto standard for admission of bad act evidence " i f its proponent sought admission 
pursuant to rule 404(b), noting that "under the traditional application of 404(b), prior to 
Doporto, there was no presumption against the admission of other crimes evidence if ii 
was being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." Decor so, 1999 UT 57 at \ 24 
(emphasis added). Rule 404(b) was amended again in 2000, deleting the 1998 changes 
upon which the Court in Decor so relied in partially overruling Doporto, Utah R. Evid. 
404, Adv. Comm. Note. The advisory committee, however, directed that the 2000 
amendment was not intended to "reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto" nor was it 
intended to lessen the requirement that evidence admitted pursuant to rule 404(b) "also 
conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible." Id, As the following analysis makes 
clear, Doporto's "very limited deference" standard remains applicable in this case 
because the state offered no basis for the forgery statement's admission under 404(b), and 
the court identified no such basis for its ruling. 
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Unclear is what recognized basis for admission the prosecutor was invoking by the 
reference to this so-called inconsistency. Admissibility is not established merely because 
a statement about committing forgery but not possessing drugs might in some sense be 
"inconsistent." Compare Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (excepting from rules against 
hearsay cross-examination of a declarant at hearing or trial concerning a prior statement 
by declarant that is inconsistent with current testimony). 
Any uncertainty as to the state's actual purpose for introducing the statement was 
dispelled during its rebuttal argument on close. The prosecutor expressly declared that by 
committing forgery, the defendant established herself as a liar, and she was acting in 
conformity therewith when she subsequently told the arresting officer that she did not use 
drugs and wanted to be tested for drugs: 
I'll tell you why [defense counsel urged the jury to focus on the possession 
charge, not the forgery conviction], he wants to divert your attention away 
from the fact that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, 
for forgery, passing bad checks. . . . The defense would lead you to believe 
that because she admitted to the forgery, what she was saying about the 
drugs was also true. That to me is very strange, ladies and gentlemen, 
because she admits to lying about something, having lied in the past and 
then wants you to believe that she }s not lying on that day. Don't be fooled 
by this. Don't be fooled. 
R. 119:242 (emphasis added). (This and other incidents of prosecutorial misconduct are 
addressed infra, Point IV.) 
The italicized portion of the foregoing quote is exactly what Rule 404 prohibits. 
The rule 404(a)(1) exception to the character evidence ban does not apply in this case. 
That rule states in pertinent part: "Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same" may be admissible. Utah R. Evid. 
404(a)(1). In this case, the defendant offered no evidence going to her truthful character; 
19 
2. The statement was not admitted to prove any exception to the rule against 
bad act evidence set forth in rule 404(b). Testimony about bad acts may be admissible 
as substantive evidence for purposes other than proving character, such as establishing 
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake[.]" Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Proper admission of bad act evidence under rule 
404(b) requires a three-part determination. 
First, "the proponent must demonstrate that the evidence is actually being offered 
for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically listed in [rule 404(b)].55 
Decor so, 1999 UT 57 at \ 21 (emphasis added). In this case, the prosecutor first sought 
admission of the forgery declaration as part of the conversation in which the officer 
connected forgery with drug use. R. 119:3. When the court prohibited any testimony 
aimed at establishing such a relationship, the prosecutor sought admission because, in his 
words, "[I]t5s an inconsistent statement there, Judge. It's admitting one thing but not 
admitting to another thing. . . . It5s the inconsistency there that I'm seeking to bring in.55 
R. 119:10. This alleged inconsistency does not pertain to any of the noncharacter reasons 
for admitting bad act evidence identified in rule 404(b). This fails the first step of the 
Decor so analysis. 
Second, the court "must determine . . . whether such evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402[.]55 Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at \ 21. Rule 402 forbids admission 
of evidence that is not relevant. Rule 401, in turn, defines relevancy as follows: 
and, therefore, provided no evidence for the state to rebut. (The prosecutor's argument to 
the contrary is addressed infra, Point IV.) 
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"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R.Evid. 401. 
"Implicit in that definition [of relevancy] are two distinct requirements: (1) The 
evidence must be probative of the proposition it is offered to prove, and (2) the 
proposition to be proved must be one that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action." United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing McCormick 
on Evidence § 185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972); 1 Weinstein 's Evidence Tf 401(03), at 401-13 
(1980); 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5162, at 18 
(1978)). 
A proposition "is of consequence," only if it is "part of the hypothesis governing 
the case[.]" Hall, 653 F.2d at 1005. In a criminal case, the "governing hypothesis . . . 
consists of elements of the offense charged and any relevant defenses raised to defeat 
criminal liability." United States v. Lamberty, 778 F.2d 59, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing 
Hall at 1005). 
In this case, the court identified nothing related to the elements of drug possession 
or the defendant's defense thereto that pertained to a concession regarding forgery. 
Without even addressing relevancy, the court admitted the statement merely because "it 
is appropriate that the jury get the context of how this arrest occurred and how the 
conversation occurred": 
This case is simple and straight forward. That while the defendant was 
being arrested on another charge there were drugs found in the nearby 
vicinity and the whole issue is whether or not the drugs were hers and the 
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jury needs to have the context of that. I am going to allow the statement of 
the defendant to come in. I agree that it is an inconsistent statement and is 
being offered by the opposing party for the purpose of going against Ms. 
Havatone. . . . [Bjottom line is that this was an inconsistent statement and 
that Ms. Havatone did make admissions to the officer, whether it be about 
the possession of the drugs or admissions about other crimes, it was still an 
admission that she made and under those circumstances, I think it is 
appropriate that the jury get the context of how this arrest occurred and how 
the conversation occurred. 
R. 119:10-11. 
The court's ruling fails to acknowledge rule 402's proscription of irrelevant 
evidence. To the contrary, the court effectively declared that so long as a statement 
constitutes an admission, especially if there is something inconsistent about it, the 
statement is admissible independent of relevancy. The court's failure to identify how the 
concession was relevant fails the second step of the Decor so analysis. 
Third, "the court must determine whether the other crimes evidence meets the 
requirements of Rule 403." Decor so, 1999 UT 57 at U 23. Rule 403 provides in pertinent 
part that even relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations[.]" Utah R. Evid. 403. 
The court employed circular reasoning to overrule the defendant's rule 403 
objection to the forgery statement. The court reasoned that no unfair prejudice flows 
from admitting the forgery statement because a forgery warrant will already have been 
mentioned; and no unfair prejudice results from mentioning the forgery warrant because it 
provides context for the forgery statement. See R. 119:14-15. 
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Lost in this ruling is not only that the forgery statement is irrelevant to any fact of 
consequence, but also that evidence of another crime is presumed prejudicial. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741, Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489. 
Moreover, the prosecution's rebuttal argument based upon the forgery statement 
caused "confusion of the issues" and "mis[led] the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. In State v. 
Ernmett, the state cross-examined the defendant regarding bad acts, thus eliciting 
impeachment evidence in compliance with rule 609. 839 P.2d 781, 786 & n.15 (Utah 
1992). During closing argument, however, the prosecutor wielded the impeachment 
evidence as substantive character evidence, arguing that because the defendant had 
previously exploited a family member, he was acting in conformity therewith when he 
abused the victim of the crime then at issue. Id. The Court declared that while the cross-
examination may have been proper, the prosecutor crossed the line when he used the 
impeachment evidence as substantive character evidence. Id. at n.15 ("However, this 
statement [by the defendant that he previously exploited a family member] does not open 
the door for the prosecution to use the past conviction substantively."). Because the prior 
bad acts were irrelevant to any fact of context, the Court determined that the prosecutor 
committed plain error in violation of rule 404. Id. 
In this case, defense counsel attempted to focus the jury's attention on the 
possession charge and away from the forgery. R. 119:238 ("I would ask that you focus 
on . . . whether or not she was in possession of the methamphetamine. This is not a case 
about forgery[.]"). In response, the prosecutor first accused defense counsel of attempting 
to mislead the jury: "I'll tell you why [defense counsel emphasized "that there's no 
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forgery charge today"], he wants to divert your attention away from the fact that the 
defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, passing bad checks." R. 
119:241-42. (The prosecutor's mention of bad checks where there existed no evidence 
thereof is addressed infra, Point IV.) More significantly, regardless of the guise in which 
the forgery evidence was admitted, the prosecutor in this case impermissibly crossed the 
same line drawn in Emmett when he used the evidence of forgery to declare the defendant 
was "lying" when confronted with the drugs: "[S]he admits to lying about something, 
having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's not lying on that day." Id. 
In so doing, the prosecutor took the forgery evidence and transformed it into substantive 
evidence of the defendant's supposed propensity for lying, thus violating the letter and 
spirit of rule 404. This fails the third Decor so step. 
The statement was admitted in violation of rule 404's ban on character evidence. 
The statement did not meet any exception to this ban.4 
B. Committing Forgery Constitutes a Bad Act pursuant to Rule 404(b). 
The court erred as a matter of law in concluding forgery is not a bad act subject to 
the requirements of rule 404. Forgery is crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003). 
Other courts have considered forgery in the context of rule 404(b). See e.g., State v. 
4
 For these same reasons, the court erred in concluding the statement was admissible as 
an admission. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) effectively says that an admission by the defendant is 
not hearsay. Even this hearsay rule, however, remains subject to the rules of relevancy: 
To be admissible, a rule 801(d)(2)(A) admission must still pertain to a fact of 
consequence. See Utah R. Evid. 402. "For statements to constitute admissions 
[admissible pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(A)] they need only relate to the offense." People 
v. Ojeda, 758 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). As detailed supra, Point I, § A, the so-called 
forgery admission relates in no way to the drug possession charge. 
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Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 58-59 (Utah 1993). Forgery is considered an act of dishonesty 
subject to evidence rule 609(a)(2) ("evidence that any witness has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement [.]"). See e.g., State v. 
McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 8, 996 P.2d 555, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). 
The trial court, however, dismissed rule 404 concerns, ruling instead that forgery 
did qualify for the evidentiary restrictions on admission of bad act evidence because it 
would come in as "context": "This is not so much admitting the prior bad acts and for the 
purposes of showing any proper purpose under 401-4(b) or anything. It is simply putting 
context for the jury as to the circumstances of this case." R. 119:10. 
The prosecution's use of the statement during closing argument, however, defies 
any such conclusion. See R. 119:242. The prosecutor focused on the forgery admission 
and conviction to paint the defendant as a liar when she committed forgery, and therefore 
as a liar when she denied drug use. Id. Thus the prosecutor used forgery as substantive 
evidence of the defendant's allegedly dishonest character. 
POINT II: THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE 
OFFICER TO SAY THE DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR 
FORGERY. 
As noted above, relevant evidence is that which makes any fact of consequence 
more or less probable. Utah R. Evid. 401. In a criminal case, facts of consequence are 
those that relate to the "elements of the offense charged and any relevant defenses raised 
to defeat criminal liability." Lamberty, 778 F.2d at 60-61 (citing Hall, 653 F.2d at 1005). 
In this case, the court allowed the officer to testify that he arrested the defendant 
on a forgery warrant because mention of a forgery arrest provided "context" for the 
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officer's retelling of the defendant's statement that she committed forgery. E.g., R. 119: 
10, 11, 15. This testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. 
Mere "context," in and of itself, does not do away with rule 402's dictate that only 
relevant evidence is admissible: "Relevancy must thus be determined in relation to the 
charges and claims being tried, rather than in the context of defenses which might have 
been raised but were not." United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 
2005). In Hedgepeth, the defendant was a city councilwoman who was convicted for 
conspiracy to extort, attempted extortion, and making false statements to federal officers. 
The FBI's initial investigation focused upon a private party it suspected of illegally 
seeking to influence city business. Id. at 414-15. The FBI sent a wired informant to talk 
to the private party who, in turn, suggested the defendant might also be in the "kickback 
business." Id. at 414-15. At trial, the prosecution sought admission of the private party's 
statement about the defendant's participation in the "kickback business" to show (1) that 
the FBI had not specifically targeted the defendant, but rather the private party, and (2) 
the defendant's and private party's "conspiratorial mindset." Id. at 419. The trial court 
admitted the statement for the purposes of context, "deem[ing] the Kickback Statement 
admissible for the limited purpose of showing to the jury why [the private party] adopted 
the course of action that he did here - in other words, why he chose to approach 
Hedgepeth and offer her a bribe." Id. (quotations omitted). 
The Court of Appeals, by contrast, construed the defendant's possible involvement 
in the "kickback business" as testimony about a prior bad act, and held that "the FBI's 
motive in investigating [the defendant] has not been shown to be probative of any 
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element of the offenses for which she was being tried." Id. at 420. The court speculated 
that had the defendant raised an entrapment defense (which she did not), the FBI's 
motivation for investigating her might have been relevant. Id. It concluded that whatever 
minimal relevance the conversation might possess was substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice. Id. at 420-21; see id. at 421 (under the specific facts of this case, the error was 
harmless). 
In Lamberty, the defendant was a postal employee convicted of opening a package 
that was not addressed to him. 778 F.2d at 60. Under direct examination by the 
prosecution, a postal inspector testified that the defendant was initially targeted for 
investigation based upon reports that he had previously opened other packages that were 
not addressed to him. Id. These prior bad acts were offered to provide context about 
why and how the government set up a trap to catch the defendant opening the package at 
issue. JW. at 60-61. The Court of Appeals examined the elements of the charge. Id. at 
61. It concluded that this bad act testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial, and justified 
reversing the conviction: 
We do not find that the evidence introduced to show the government's 
motive in setting the trap is in any way relevant to proving the elements of 
the counts charged. While the jurors may have been curious as to why the 
inspectors began their operation, enlightenment on this matter had no 
probative value. 
Lamberty at 61. 
These cases highlight the justifiable concern over irrelevant and prejudicial bad act 
evidence being admitted under the guise of "context." In this case, the defendant's arrest 
for forgery had no bearing upon the elements of the possession charge she then was 
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facing. It had no bearing on the defendant's theory of the case: that the small amount of 
methamphetamine found in the police care was not hers: 
Q. Kimberly, you have heard testimony and have seen evidence 
today in regards to that twist [of methamphetamine] over there. Does that 
methamphetamine belong to you? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know anything about that methamphetamine? 
A. No. 
R. 119:196. 
"Context" has also been used to justify admitting testimony as foundation for 
subsequent relevant testimony about the crime itself. See United States v. Garcia-
Morales, 382 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing whether drug trade provided context 
for subsequent testimony about the defendant's involvement in a drug conspiracy). The 
officer's testimony about the forgery warrant in this case was initially admitted to lay 
foundation, or 1o provide context, for the officer's testimony about the defendant's 
subsequent forgery statement. E.g.,R. 10. The officer's retelling of the defendant's 
forgery statement, however, also was irrelevant and inadmissible. Supra, Point I. Absent 
admission of the forgery declaration, even the state conceded that no reason existed to 
say the defendant was arrested for forgery. R. 119:3. Thus admission of the officer's 
testimony about the forgery warrant may not be justified as context or foundation for any 
subsequent admissible testimony. 
Finally, "context" has been used to justify testimony "Ho complete the story of the 
crime on trial:" United States v. Sheffield, 992 F.2d 1164, 1170 (11th Cir. 1993) 
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(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
In this case, testimony that the defendant was initially arrested on some other charge was, 
at most, minimally relevant to the subsequent drug possession charge. That the arrest 
was for forgery bears no relation to the subsequent discovery of methamphetamine in the 
officer's car. 
Even if testimony telling the jury that an outstanding arrest warrant for forgery 
was minimally relevant, it should have been excluded because its probative value was 
outweighed by unfair prejudice: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury [.]" Utah R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 operates to keep 
out evidence of minimal probative value "dragged in by the heels for the sake of its 
prejudicial effect." United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979). "As to 
such, Rule 403 is meant to relax the iron rule of relevance, to permit the trial judge to 
preserve the fairness of the proceedings by exclusion despite its relevance." Id. 
As noted above, testimony that the defendant was arrested for forgery bears no 
relation to either the elements of drug possession, nor to any defense actually raised. The 
forgery declaration for which it supposedly provided context should never have been 
admitted. Supra, Point I. Apropos, therefore, is the McRae court's observation about the 
function of rule 403 to prevent evidence of minimal value being dragged in primarily for 
prejudicial effect. 
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POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO CROSS 
EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE DETAILS OF HER 
FORGERY CONVICTION. 
The trial court erred in allowing the state to cross-examine the defendant as to the 
details of her forgery conviction that went beyond its nature, date and punishment. 
Rule 609 permits introduction of evidence of certain crimes including forgery for 
impeachment purposes. Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). The use of such evidence is strictly 
restricted to impeachment, and for good reason: 
[A] Rule 609(a) inquiry should be limited to the nature of the crime, the date 
of the conviction and the punishment. A prosecutor may not parade the 
details of the prior crime in front of the jury. The defendant is subject to 
cross-examination only to test his veracity and credibility and thus collateral 
matters should properly be limited to an effort to discredit him as a witness, 
and not merely to prejudice the jury against the defendant. Care must be 
taken to insure the defendant is not convicted for past rather than present 
crimes. 
Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822 (quotes, citations and notes omitted). 
In Tucker, this court allowed cross-examination into the details of the prior 
conviction because the defendant opened the door by attempting to minimize his 
culpability. 800 P.2d at 823. 
In State v. Colwell, by contrast, the defendant strictly limited his testimony on 
direct exam to the prior convictions' nature, date and sentence. 2000 UT 8, f^ 31, 944 
P.2d 177. On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to extract details from the 
defendant about those convictions. Id. Relying upon language from Tucker, the Court 
emphasized that rule 609 impeachment is allowed only to challenge the "'defendant's 
credibility as a witness.'" Id. at \ 34 (quoting Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822). In other words, 
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while rule 609 impeachment may be employed to call into question the defendant's 
credibility as a witness at trial, it may not be used as character evidence or "'merely to 
prejudice the jury against the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Tucker at 822). Rule 609 
impeachment is strictly limited because "'inquiry into the details of prior convictions 
[has] been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error.'" Id. at \ 33 (quoting 
Tucker at 821). 
In Colwell, the defendant was convicted for attempted aggravated murder when he 
pulled a gun on an officer during a routine traffic stop. 2000 UT 8 at fflf 1, 5. During the 
defendant's cross-examination, the state attempted to go into details about prior 
convictions for riot and theft, particularly that the defendant shot someone during those 
crimes. Id. at ^ 31-32. The Court ruled that going into details about the prior 
convictions was impermissible because while they may bear upon the defendant's 
credibility as a witness, they could not be used to prove the defendant acted in conformity 
therewith when he allegedly committed the more recent crime. Id. at *f 33. Evidence 
about using a gun on prior occasions was inadmissible because it would show his 
propensity for gun use on a later occasion: "We do not agree that the details of the 
defendant's prior convictions are relevant to his state of mind at the time of the traffic 
stop." Id? 
5
 Because the trial judge in Colwell sustained defense counsel's objection to the state's 
first improper question and the defendant did not answer the second improper question, 
the Court did "not find prejudicial error subject to reversal." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at f^ 38. 
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During direct examination in this case, the defendant testified as to the nature of 
the prior conviction, as well as to the statement she made upon being confronted with the 
drug from the patrol car. R. 119:193-94. She did not go into detail about either the 
conviction or the statement; she did not attempt to explain away or attribute any special 
meaning or significance to either: 
Q. There's also been some testimony as you have heard in regards 
to a forgery warrant. What can you tell us about that? 
A. I pled guilty to a forgery that I committed and I took the 
responsibility of that. 
Q1. Do you remember having a conversation with Officer Malley in 
regards to that? 
A. Yes. 
Q». You've testified that there were the topic of the forgery, correct? 
[sic] 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Can you tell us during that conversation that you had with 
Officer Malley, what you acknowledged or admitted that you're taking 
responsibility for and what you did not acknowledge and take responsibility 
for during that conversation? 
A. I told Officer Malley that I did commit the forgery and that I 
didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car. 
[Questioning continued on a different topic] 
R. 119:193-94. 
Pursuant to rule 609, the state in this case could have questioned the defendant 
about the conviction's date and sentence. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at f^ 37. Instead, the 
prosecutor did not merely seek details, but rather read the entire forgery statute, thus 
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leaving to the jury's imagination how many of the several ways to commit forgery and 
victimize others the defendant may have utilized. R. 119:197.6 In response to defense 
counsel's objection, the prosecutor claimed that the defendant "opened the door," and 
justified delving into the forgery conviction by stating that "the term forgery is something 
that I think is a bit amorphous." R. 119:197-98. The court overruled the objection, 
authorizing the prosecutor to continue with these "questions," thereby also allowing the 
prosecutor to elicit testimony specifically concerning dishonesty: 
Q. And just so that I'm clear and (inaudible) forgery, real quick, so 
forgery is something that somebody is guilty of, with the purpose to defraud 
anyone or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he or she alters a writing of another without his authority or 
authenticates, issues transfers, publishes or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, 
whether the person is existent or non-existent, what purports to have been 
executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than what's in 
the (inaudible) case or to be a copy of an original when no such original 
existed. That's what a forgery is, right? 
Defense Counsel. And Your Honor, I'm going to make an objection 
for the record at this time. I want to object on two grounds. First of all, on 
relevance and also it's beyond the scope of my direct. Ms. Havatone is not 
here today charged with forgery. We're here today just to discuss the sole 
count of possession of an illegal substance. 
6 Forcing the defendant to admit to violating any or all of the elements of forgery, without 
any narrowing, causes the same mischief prohibited in Emrnett, supra. There, the 
prosecutor crossed-examined the defendant about concocting a story. 839 P.2d at 786-
87. The prosecutor, however, possessed no evidence with which to 'prove up' the 
allegation. Id. The Court condemned this practice because it "allow[s] the imaginative 
and overzealous prosecutor to concoct a damaging line of examination which could leave 
with the jury the impression that defendant was anything the question, by innuendo, 
seemed to suggest." Id. at 787 n.18. In this case, the prosecutor planted the impression 
that the defendant could have done anything or everything prohibited by the forgery 
statute. 
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The Court. Thank you. Any response? 
Prosecutor. Just briefly, Judge. I believe the door was opened to 
discussion along these lines. It was opened on direct. The term forgery is 
something that I think is a bit amorphous and also a legal term. I think it's 
important for everybody in the court to be clear so that we're all on the same 
page in terms of what we're talking about. 
The Court. I'll allow the witness to answer the questions to the 
extent that she has knowledge of what the legal forgery is [sic]. 
Q. So those are the elements of the crime forgery as far as you know, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So this is a situation that involves someone's honesty, doesn't it? 
A. Yes. 
R. 119:197-98. 
During the state's rebuttal argument, there occurred no attempt to relate the prior 
convictiontothedefendanfs credibility as a witness at trial. See R. 119:241-42. Rather, 
in contrast to the holding in Colwell, the prosecutor declared that because the defendant 
was "lying" when she committed forgery, she "lied" yet again when she told the officer 
that she had done forgery, but had nothing to do with drugs: 
The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the 
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is 
very strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about 
something, having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's 
not lying on that day. Don't be fooled by this. Don't be fooled. 
R. 119:242. As noted in Point I, the prosecutor's subsequent use of impeachment 
evidence as substantive character evidence constitutes plain error. See Emmett, 839 P.2d 
at 786 n.15 (declaring that while proper impeachment evidence may have been elicited 
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through cross-examination, the prosecutor went too far during closing argument by using 
the impeachment evidence as substantive character evidence). 
In sum, the prosecutor in this case violated rule 609 by seeking more than the 
nature, date and sentence for forgery during the defendant's cross-examination. More 
prejudicial than merely investigating details, the prosecutor recited each statutory element 
of forgery and made the defendant admit that forgery involves dishonestly, thus leaving 
to the jury's imagination how many types of forgery this untrustworthy person 
committed. R. 119:197-98. The prosecutor used this testimony not to undermine the 
defendant's testimony as a witness at trial, but rather to declare that because the 
defendant had "lied in the past," the jury must conclude she was "lying" the day she 
denied possessing drugs. R. 119:242. The trial court abused its discretion in overruling 
the defendant's objection to this cross-examination. 
POINT IV: THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT. 
During the state's rebuttal argument, the prosecutor alleged that defense counsel 
was trying to deceive the jury, he accused the defendant of passing bad checks when no 
such evidence existed in the record, he stated his personal belief that the defendant was 
"lying," and, most troublesome, he argued that because the defendant had been dishonest 
in the past, she must have been lying when she denied possessing drugs. 
An attorney enjoys "considerable latitude" to discuss the theory of a case during 
closing argument, and may suggest reasonable deductions arising from the evidence that 
supports the theory. State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, If 9, 113 P.3d 998 (quoting State 
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, TJ 56, 979 P.2d 799). However, prosecutorial misconduct during 
35 
closing argument requires reversal where (1) "the remarks call to the attention of jurors 
matters which they could not properly consider in determining their verdict/5 and (2) the 
remarks are prejudicial. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ]f 39. "If determined to be harmful, 
improper statements will require reversal." Id. 
The individual instances of prosecutorial misconduct are discussed below. 
Common to each instance is the prosecutor's transformation of the forgery evidence into 
impermissible substantive character evidence, arguing that because the forgery conviction 
involved dishonesty, the defendant was "lying on that day" when she admitted 
committing forgery but denied possessing the drugs. R. 119:242; compare Emmett, 839 
P.2d at 786 n.15 (declaring that while bad act evidence may have been properly elicited 
through cross-examination, plain error occurred when the prosecutor used this 
impeachment evidence as substantive character evidence during closing argument). 
A. The Prosecutor Impermissibly Accused Defense Counsel of Misleading the 
Jury, 
A prosecutor's allegations that defense counsel has attempted to "becloud the 
issue," or "deceive the jury" may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. 
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah App. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Gilman, 368 A.2d 253, 258 (1977)). 
In this case, the prosecution not only disparaged defense counsel, but did so based 
upon an argument that defense counsel never asserted. As detailed above, during direct 
examination the defendant admitted to a prior forgery conviction, and also that she told 
the officer who found the drugs in his patrol car that "I did commit the forgery and that I 
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didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car." R. 119:194. This 
testimony, however, came in only as the result of the prosecutor's pretrial motion to 
admit it - over the defendant's objections. See R. 119:2-16, 96. The statement was 
initially disclosed to the jury through the testimony of the arresting officer. R. 119:142 
(quoting the defendant as stating, "I did a forgery but I don't do drugs, you can test me."). 
During rebuttal, the prosecutor claimed the defendant was attempting to accredit 
the drug denial by highlighting her candor in admitting forgery. R. 119:241-42. The 
defendant, however, never made this argument. In fact, defense counsel described the 
discovery of the drug and the defendant's response in closing argument without 
mentioning forgery: 
And last but not least, we've also heard testimony from both the officer and 
Ms. Havatone indicating that upon being confronted with the incriminating 
evidence, the drugs, Ms. Havatone said, it's not mine and I'm willing to take 
a drug test for it. However, a drug test was never performed on her because 
if she was doing that, chances are it would have shown up on the drug test. 
R. 119:228. 
Defense counsel's only argument regarding forgery was made in the context of 
urging focus on the possession charge facing the defendant, not on the prior forgery 
conviction: 
Now there's testimony and at least when I started keeping count in Mr. 
Nelson's closing arguments, at least the mention of the forgery was three 
prior times. However, I would ask you to just stay focused on the facts of 
this case. This is what we have to present to you. You could accept it or 
you could reject it; however, I would ask that you focus on, as you 
deliberate, whether or not she was in possession of the methamphetamine. 
This is not a case about forgery and besides the fact that Mr. Nelson took 
out his book, his law book and read to you the definition of forgery, this is 
not what this case is about. 
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R. 119:238-39. Defense counsel, however, did not argue that because the defendant took 
responsibility for the forgery, her denial of possessing drugs was more credible. See id. 
Yet in closing argument, the prosecutor attributed precisely this argument to the 
defendant, and then declared the argument was intended to mislead the jury: 
I want to talk to you about the conflicts of the evidence today because you 
heard from one person from the prosecution's side and one person from the 
defense's side and the defense in his closing argument made a pretty big 
deal about the fact that the defendant had been convicted of forgery, wanted 
to bring that to your attention and make sure that you're clear on the fact 
that there's no forgery charge today. Why do you think that is, ladies and 
gentlemen? Think about that for a second. Why was he so insistent about 
that? I'll tell you why, he wants to divert your attention away from the fact 
that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, 
passing bad checks. You heard the definition of what a forgery is. . . . The 
defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the forgery, 
what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is very 
strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about something, 
having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's not lying on 
that day. Don't be fooled by this. Don't be fooled. 
R. 119:241-42 (emphasis added). 
The prosecutor committed misconduct by urging consideration of defense 
counsel's integrity. 
B. The Prosecutor Accused the Defendant of "Passing Bad Checks" Even 
Though No Such Evidence Was Presented at Trial. 
The prosecutor delved into the statutory definition of forgery during the 
defendant's cross-examination, yet never asked about which of the many ways of 
committing forgery, per section 76-6-501(a), the defendant engaged in. R. 119:197-98. 
No mention of passing bad checks came in through the testimony of the officer or the 
defendant. 
38 
Then, during rebuttal argument suggesting that defense counsel was seeking to 
mislead the jury, the prosecutor accused the defendant of passing bad checks: "I'll tell 
you why [defense counsel urged focus on the possession charge rather than the prior 
forgery conviction], he wants to divert your attention away from the fact that the 
defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, passing bad checks" R. 
119:242 (emphasis added). 
The prosecutor committed misconduct by accusing the defendant of committing a 
criminal act of which the record contains no evidence. 
C. The Prosecutor Voiced His Personal Opinion that the Defendant Lied When 
She Denied Drug Possession. 
"[A] prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she asserts personal knowledge 
of the facts in issue or expresses personal opinion, being ca form of unsworn, unchecked 
testimony which tends to exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine 
the objective detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued."5 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 3-5.8 (2d ed. 1980)). 
During rebuttal in this case, as noted above, the prosecutor attributed to defense 
counsel an argument never made in which the candor shown in admitting forgery was 
used to accredit the drug denial. R. 119:242. In rebutting this supposed argument, the 
prosecutor asserts his personal believe that the argument is "very strange" and, in fact, 
because the defendant had previously "lied" she was "lying" when she denied drug use: 
The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the 
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is 
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very strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about 
something, having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's 
not lying on that day. 
R. 119:242 (emphasis added). 
Misconduct occurred when the prosecutor stated his personal belief that the 
defendant was "lying" when she denied drug possession. 
D. The Prosecutor Urged Consideration of Inadmissible Character Evidence, 
The most troublesome aspect of the prosecution's argument was his express 
appeal to inadmissible character evidence. Prosecutorial misconduct occurs "if the 
actions or remarks of counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be 
justified in determining its verdict[.]" State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 
1989). Rule 404 forbids evidence of bad acts introduced to show conformity therewith 
on another occasion. Thus, a jury is not justified in considering such evidence. See State 
v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, f^ 14, 108 P.3d 730 (considering but rejecting claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct based upon improper argument regarding former crimes on grounds not 
relevant herein); State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, ffif 13-14, 138 P.3d 90 (same). 
As noted supra, Points I and III, the court erred in admitting the defendant's 
comment about committing forgery because it was irrelevant bad act evidence offered to 
impugn the defendant's character. The prosecutor used the comment to "prove the 
character of [the defendant] in order to show action in conformity therewith." Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b). He effectively accused the defendant of "lying" when she denied 
possessing drugs because forgery is a crime of dishonesty: 
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The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the 
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is 
very strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about 
something, having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's 
not lying on that day. 
R. 119:241-42 (emphasis added). 
The jury received one clear message: The defendant lied in the past, so she lied 
when confronted with the drugs. This argument beseeches the jury to consider irrelevant 
and inadmissible character evidence. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786 n.15. This constitutes 
misconduct. 
POINT V: TAKEN ALONE OR TOGETHER THE ERRORS DETAILED 
ABOVE CAUSED HARM. 
Determining the harm caused by the errors detailed above requires that they be 
considered in the context of the evidence and arguments at trial. E.g.,Larsen, 2005 UT 
App 201 at U 5; see Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at If 37 (violation of rule 609 harmless where 
defendant's objection was sustained, questioning was suspended, and cautionary 
instruction was given). 
Harm sufficient to require reversal occurs unless "it is 'sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of proceedings.'" See, e.g., Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517 at *f 28 (quoting 
Loose, 2000 UT 11 at Tf 10 n.l). Under the plain error doctrine, reversal is required 
where the evidentiary error was "obviously improper and harmful and that [the] failure to 
object did not lead the court into error." Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785. In this case, the errors 
and consequent harm meet either standard. Especially when considered cumulatively, the 
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errors herein undermine confidence that the defendant received a fair trial. See State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
124 &n.l5 (Utah 1989). 
In Emmett, the state during closing argument impermissibly transformed 
impeachment evidence into substantive character evidence. 839 P.2d at 786 & n.15. In 
considering whether the error was harmful under the more deferential plain error 
standard, the Court noted that, indeed, there existed sufficient evidence in the record to 
support a conviction. Id. at 786. The Court, however, observed that "[i]n close cases, the 
substantive use of a prior conviction can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction[.]" 
Id. It held that, especially when considered with other errors, "[T]here is a reasonable 
likelihood that absent the errors a different result would have occurred.... [W]e 
conclude that the error was of sufficient magnitude as to warrant a new trial." Id. 
The evidence in this case was very close. No direct evidence existed that the 
defendant possessed the drugs. R. 119:214-15. The officer allowed the defendant to 
change her clothes - outside his presence, then cuffed her in back, pat-searched her and 
her coat, and belted her in the right side of the patrol car. Supra, Statement of Facts, "The 
evidence in general." After the defendant stepped out of the car, the officer found a small 
amount of methamphetamine - located not toward the right side of the backseat, but 
rather right in the middle, amid other "foliage" and "debris." Id. The officer asserted he 
always checks the rear seat after transporting prisoners, therefore the drug must have 
belonged to the defendant. Id. The defendant countered that while she may have 
committed forgery, she did not do drugs and, in fact, she requested a drug test. Id. 
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Combined with the closeness of the evidence are the several errors: Admission of 
the irrelevant, prejudicial forgery statement; allowing equally irrelevant testimony that the 
defendant was initially arrested for forgery; permitting improper cross-examination 
regarding the forgery conviction; and especially the argument based upon very prejudicial 
character evidence during rebuttal. Given the foregoing, especially when considered 
cummulatively, the errors may not be labeled as harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's conviction should be vacated and a new trial granted. 
DATED this<£_ day of June, 2007. 
JOHN PACE 
PATRICK S. TAN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061900841 FS 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
Date: February 5, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Prosecutor: NELSON, STEPHEN L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAN, PATRICK S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 12, 1974 
Video 
Tape Count: 94 02 7 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 12/05/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
P a n p 1 
Case No: 061900841 
Date: Feb 05, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
RUN CONSECTIVELY WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 60 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: S L LEGAL DEFENDERS S L COUNTY ATTORNEY 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
PAYMENTS PER AP&P 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 60 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by February 7, 2007 by 9 a.m.. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Paae 2 
Case No: 061900841 
Date: Feb 05, 2007 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
COMPLY WITH ALL A/D CLAUSES PER AP&P, COMPLETE ANY ADDITIONAL 
TREATMENT PER AP&P 
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE 
RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE, DEFT TO BE IN FULL 
COMPLIANCE WITH PROBATION OR SERVE PRISON SENTENCE 
D^/^r^ ") / 1 -, „4- \ 
TabB 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation 
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of 
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree 
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; 
or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years 
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, 
and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of 
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a 
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce 
of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-
1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one 
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to 
controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to 
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or 
other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration 
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the 
use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, 
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under 
the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this 
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds 
of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which 
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, 
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or 
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree 
felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less 
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, 
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit 
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware 
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a 
bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did 
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by 
an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(10)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian 
religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(l)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense 
under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause 
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to 
the charges. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
TabC 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the 
prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
(Utah R. Evid. 404 cont.) 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence 
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of 
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a 
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been 
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or 
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of 
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense 
(Utah R. Evid. 609, cont.) 
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that 
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence. 
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence 
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
